Dan Bellamy founded Recon, a fire retardant installation company,2 in 1990. Shortly thereafter, the company signed the National Refractory Agreement (“NRA”), the Bricklayers`CBA, with the International Union of Skilled Workers of Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers (“International”). Recon used local members 4 to do all the refractory work for the next decade. According to the express conditions of the NRA, Local 4 Bricklayers installed not only refractory bricks, but “all refractory materials,” including ceramic fiber (also known as Kao Wool), plastics and spray insulation (or gunite). The NRA also included a clause that preserves the right of masons to “craft all work that has historically or traditionally been awarded.”3 On December 20, 1999, Recon signed a new contract with the Bricklayern that came into force retroactively on November 14, 1999 and contained the same level of service as the 1990 agreement. However, in January 2000, the Bricklayers discovered that work on the Arco site, with non-brick-layer employees, was recognized on the Arco site,6 without informing Local 4, as required by the NRA. It was the first time since Recon`s inception that other employees than Bricklayers were doing this kind of refractory work. Recon Refractory, 339 N.L.R.B to 828. On January 28, 2000, the Bricklayers filed a complaint claiming that the assignment of employees to non-Bricklayers was contrary to their contract with Recon. Recon`s agreement with the IPTW, as the Bricklayers describe it, was “unusual.” Bellamy testified that the company itself was “persecuting” the union to represent its unskilled workers. Recon`s executives “made several phone calls, spoke to other contractors who are covered by collective agreements and ended up landing with the IPTW.” IPTW workers had to join the union and sign detox cards to “disable” at the end of each membership job. Recon essentially paid the union dues of these workers and increased their pay to offset the higher costs. Through these manoeuvres, Recon ensured that its workers were not represented by any union in any other workplace than us-Borax.
The Supreme Court recognized this exception with its consent and found that “the Chamber found that judicial strikes in favour of contractual rights do not constitute violations of [B) (4) (D), although the language of this section contained no provision for any special treatment of such strikes.” CBS, 364 U.S. at 577 n. 12, 81 S.C. 330. We also accepted this exception and confirmed that the hearing was cancelled because the litigation was not really competent. despite a literal violation of Article 8 (b) (4) (D)12 Cf. (z.B. USCP-WESCO II, 827 F.2d to 584-85 (decision upholding the House`s decision to cancel the hearing in point 10, point (k), because it was overturned by the employer`s breach of the collective agreement and was therefore not really competent); Foley-Wismer II, 695 F.2d at 427-28 (confirms a decision by the House to cancel the hearing in the absence of a legal dispute because the work claimed by one union had never been performed or sought by the other union); See.